This week’s newsletter links to a description of methods for preventing
hardware wallets from leaking private information through transaction
signatures, provides an update on the BIP322 generic
protocol, and summarizes a recent meeting of the Bitcoin Core PR Review
Club. Also included are our regular sections about new releases and
notable merges of popular Bitcoin infrastructure projects.
None this week.
Exfiltration resistant nonce protocols: Pieter Wuille sent an email to the Bitcoin-Dev mailing list providing an overview of techniques that can prevent a hardware wallet or other offline signing device from communicating secret information to a third party by biasing the nonces in the ECDSA or schnorr signatures it creates. The email is clearly written and packed with information. Anyone with an interest in secure use of external signers should consider reading it.
signmessage—progress or perish: BIP322 author Karl-Johan Alm noted that his PR to add support for the generic
signmessageprotocol has not seen any progress towards getting merged for the past several months. He’s seeking feedback—including “unfiltered criticism”—about whether to take a different approach or to simply abandon the proposal. As we’ve mentioned previously, there is currently no widely adopted way for wallets to create and verify signed messages for anything besides legacy P2PKH addresses. If wallet developers want to enable this capability for P2SH, P2WPKH, P2WSH, and (if taproot is activated) P2TR addresses, they are recommended to review Alm’s email and provide feedback on their preferred path forward.
Bitcoin Core PR Review Club
The Bitcoin Core PR Review Club is a weekly IRC meeting for newer contributors to the Bitcoin Core project to learn about the review process. An experienced Bitcoin Core contributor provides background information about a selected PR and then leads a discussion on IRC.
The Review Club is an excellent way to learn about the Bitcoin protocol, the Bitcoin Core reference implementation, and the process of making changes to Bitcoin. Notes, questions and meeting logs are posted on the website for those who are unable to attend in real time, and as a permanent resource for those wishing to learn about the Bitcoin Core development process.
In this section, we summarize a recent Bitcoin Core PR Review Club meeting, highlighting some of the important questions and answers. Click on a question below to see a summary of the answer from the meeting.
Try to preserve outbound block-relay-only connections during restart is a PR (#17428) by Hennadii Stepanov which adds the concept of anchor connections to Bitcoin Core, which are peers the node will preferably try to reconnect to between restarts. These persistent connections could mitigate some classes of eclipse attacks.
Discussion began by establishing some fundamental concepts of eclipse attacks:
What is an eclipse attack?An eclipse attack is when a node has been isolated from all honest peers.
How would an adversary eclipse a node?Fill up their IP address list with addresses the attacker owns, then force them to restart or wait for them to restart.
If a node is eclipsed, what sort of attacks can an adversary execute on the victim?Withholding blocks, censoring transactions, and de-anonymizing transaction sources.
Then changes in the PR were analyzed:
How does this PR mitigate an eclipse attack?By keeping a list of some of the nodes you were connected to (anchor connections) and then reconnecting to them on restart.
What are the conditions for a peer to become an anchor?The peer must be a blocks-relay-only peer.
Later in the meeting, there was discussion about the trade-offs and design decisions in the PR:
Why are only blocks-relay-only peers used as anchors?To make network topology inference harder and preserve network privacy.
What happens if you choose an anchor that is able to remote-crash your node?The malicious peer would be able to repeatedly crash your node on restart.
Several Review Club participants commented on the PR, where discussion on design decisions continues.
Releases and release candidates
New releases and release candidates for popular Bitcoin infrastructure projects. Please consider upgrading to new releases or helping to test release candidates.
Notable code and documentation changes
- Eclair #1323 allows nodes to advertise that they’ll accept channel
opens with a value higher than the previous limit of about 0.168 BTC.
They do this by using the new
option_support_large_channelfeature in the
initmessage, which was recently added to BOLT 9. Supporting channel capacities larger than 0.168 BTC is part of the feature set known informally as “wumbo”. See Newsletter #22 for details.