This week’s newsletter describes some recent discussion about the schnorr and taproot proposals, notes the recent update of the proposal formerly known as OP_CHECKOUTPUTSHASHVERIFY and OP_SECURETHEBAG, links to a proposal to standardize LN watchtowers, and summarizes notable changes to popular Bitcoin infrastructure projects.

None this week.

## News

• Continued schnorr/taproot discussion: this week, Russell O’Connor started a thread on the Bitcoin-Dev mailing list continuing a previous discussion about having signatures commit to the position of the opcode that’s expected to evaluate that signature (e.g. the opcodes OP_CHECKSIG, OP_CHECKSIGVERIFY, or tapscript’s new OP_CHECKSIGADD). O’Connor argues that this commitment provides additional protection for people who use scripts with multiple branches that allow the script to be satisfied in several different ways using signatures from more than one user. Without this protection, it might be possible for Mallory to ask Bob to sign for branch A when Mallory is really going to use that signature in branch B. An existing opcode, OP_CODESEPARATOR, helps deal with such situations, but it’s not well known and so addressing the concern directly could improve safety and possibly eliminate the need to include OP_CODESEPARATOR in tapscript.

Following some IRC discussion by several participants, Anthony Towns replied with a suggested alternative: scripts that are susceptible to this problem should have their branches separated into multiple taproot leaves each with just one code branch. Tapscript signatures already commit to the script being executed, so a signature that’s valid for one script can’t be used in another script. Towns also described why committing only to the position might not guarantee protection against repositioned signatures. Although he did describe a method that he thinks could provide superior protection, he believes it’s not particularly useful compared to just keeping OP_CODESEPARATOR in tapscript.

In a separate schnorr-related topic, ZmnSCPxj wrote a post about the challenges of safely using the MuSig signature aggregation protocol with sub-groups. For example, ZmnSCPxj’s nodelets proposal suggests Alice and Bob could jointly control funds through a single LN node using the aggregation of their keys, (A, B). Their joint node could then open a channel to Charlie’s node, using MuSig aggregation there too, ((A, B), C). However, ZmnSCPxj describes why this might be unsafe given Wagner’s algorithm as described in last week’s newsletter. Also described are several alternative schemes that attempt to work around the problem.

• OP_CHECKTEMPLATEVERIFY (CTV): the successor to OP_CHECKOUTPUTSHASHVERIFY (COSHV) described in Newsletter #48 and OP_SECURETHEBAG mentioned in Newsletter #49, this new opcode proposed by Jeremy Rubin would allow a script to ensure its funds could only be spent by a specified set of child transactions. In addition to the name change, Rubin has also added additional details to the proposed BIP and he plans to hold a review workshop in the first few months of 2020 (fill out this form if you’re interested in attending).

On-list, Russell O’Connor restated a previous concern of his about CTV pulling data off the stack in an abnormal order for Bitcoin Script. This was added by Rubin in order to prevent the creation of recursive covenants—script conditions that apply not just to a finite set of descendant transactions but which will apply to all spends descended from a particular script in perpetuity. For example, a spender could restrict the future receivers of a set of coins to just three addresses—any payment to any other address would be forbidden. O’Connor’s concerns seemed to focus on this odd behavior of CTV making it harder to model the semantics of Bitcoin Script, something which O’Connor has previously worked on and which is related to his continuing work on the Simplicity scripting language.

On IRC, Gregory Maxwell and Jeremy Rubin discussed several aspects of CTV, especially focusing on making the proposed opcode easier to use with advanced designs without making it harder to use with the simple congestion controlled transactions and payment pools already proposed. They also discussed whether it was really necessary to prevent people from creating recursive covenants, with a possible allusion in the conversation to a 2013 thread started by Maxwell about awful ways misguided people might use recursive covenants.

• Proposed watchtower BOLT: Sergi Delgado Segura posted to the Lightning-Dev mailing list a draft BOLT he and Patrick McCorry have been working on. Watchtowers are services that broadcast penalty transactions on behalf of LN nodes that may be offline, recovering any funds that would otherwise have been lost due to an old channel state being confirmed onchain. The goal of the proposed specification is to allow all LN implementations to interoperate with any watchtower rather than there being a different watchtower implementation for every LN implementation.

## Notable code and documentation changes

Notable changes this week in Bitcoin Core, C-Lightning, Eclair, LND, libsecp256k1, Bitcoin Improvement Proposals (BIPs), and Lightning BOLTs.

• C-Lightning #3259 adds experimental support for payment secrets, which are proposed in BOLTs #643 as part of enabling multipath payments. The payment secret is generated by the receiver and included in their BOLT11 invoice. The spender includes this secret in the part of their payment that’s encrypted to the receiver’s key. The receiver only accepts an incoming payment for the invoice if it contains the secret, preventing any other nodes from probing the receiver to see whether it’s expecting additional payments to a previously-used payment hash.

• C-Lightning #3268 changes the default network from Bitcoin testnet to Bitcoin mainnet. It also adds a new configuration option, include, that includes any configuration directives provided in the indicated file.